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Constitutionalising Labour Rights In Canada and Europe: Freedom of 




A catalogue of human rights can be an admirable instrument  ǥǤ          
the function of law reform from Parliament, the Government 
and the Law Commission to the Bench and to the Bar. Some 
may consider this as a risk, others as an opportunity. But it 
should be faced with open eyes. The potential significance of 
such a development should not be underestimated.1 
 
I. Introduction  
 
 Why are unions in Canada and the European Union going to court to claim 
that the rights to bargain collectively and to strike are fundamental human rights 
and thus constitutionally protected?2 At the level of immediate legal strategy the 
answer is obvious. The assumption is that if these collective labour rights are 
elevated to a fundamental constitutional level and given a hard edge, they will not 
only save workers from the worst depredations of neo-liberal and austerity policies 
but also provide a secure basis for resocialising Canada and Europe.3 However, from 
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1 O Kahn-	ǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? The 
Cambridge Law Journal 241, 270. 
2 Ǯǯgenerated 
an expanding literature. For early contributions see 	ǡǮ
Labour Rights: From Social Economic and Social Rights to Fundamental ǫǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Ƭ ? ?ǢǡǮ
Rights in Common Law Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law through ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?1.  
3 ǤǡǮǣǯǡǡǫǯȋȌ, Labour Rights as 
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a longer term perspective, framing claims to collective action in terms of human 
rights and advancing such claims in the adjudicative fora of courts is a departure ǯ
democratic politics and by mobilization in the workplace and on the streets.4  
 Ruth Dukes has recently reminded labour law scholars that Kahn-Freund 
adopted a sociological or socio-legal methodology.5 For Kahn-Freund the sociology Ǯǡǥǥǯ.6 My aim is to take Kahn-	ǯ
the epigraph to this paper to heart, and my approach to the question I began by 
posing is socio-legal and not the normative or philosophical question of ǮǯǤ7 My perspective does not gainsay 
the need to grapple with the complex normative questions that arise when 
attempting to justify the characterisation of collective labour rights as a type of 
human right that should be constitutionally protected by courts. However, I believe 
that it is important to draw back and widen the aperture of analysis in order to 
appreciate what this shift in the lexicon and grammar of claims making by workers 
and unions reveals about how rights and courts have become central to how power 
is legitimated in the contemporary globalised world.  
 The goal of constitutionalising labour rights is, I will argue, a specific example 
of the broader and much more pervasive global constitutionalisation that 
characterises our contemporary world. Global constitutionalism involves a shift in ǯǡǡǮ
transnational constitutionalism, which integrates and systematically consolidates 
political institutions operating in the national, supranational and transnational ǯ.8 I am using Chris Thornhillǯsociological functionalist 
theoretical frame because he is concerned with the functional reality that 
constitutional norms acquire in the societal environments in which they are 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005) 61, 82Ȃ4; N Countouris and M 
Freedland (eds), Resocialising Europe: In a Time of Crisis (Cambridge 2013).   
4 ǤǮ
ǯton (ed), Labour Rights as 
Human Rights ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǢ	ǡǮǣ		ǫǯ (2007) 29 Comparative Labor 
Law & Policy Journal 29. 
5 R Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law  (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 199. 
6 Dukes (n 5Ȍ ? ? ?ǡ	ǡǮǯǡǮ ?  
7 H Becker, What about Mozart? What about Murder? Reasoning from Cases ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ?Ǥ
ǡǮ
the PaǯǡȋȌǡLuhmann on Law and 
Politics: Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 101, 102-3 on 
the difference between a sociological approach to fundamental rights and the 
current (dominant) philosophical. 
8 ǡǮ
ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
International Journal of Law in Context 357, 367 (emphasis in the original).  
 3 
ǤǮ
norms, changing societal functions and changing demands for law, power and 
legitimacyǯ.9 
 I will begin by discussing the legal literature on multiple constitutions, which 
has highlighted the tension between social and labour rights and economic 
structures, and I will ǯ to global 
constitutionalism adds to the account. I will then turn to examine how international 
human rights are invoked by trade unions in Canada and the EU to constitutionalize 
the rights to bargain collectively and to strike, and my specific focus is on how 
courts deploy these rights in their reasoning and the circulation of international 
human rights through different adjudicative sites. I will begin by looking at Canada, 
where unions were early strategic actors lodging complaints with International 
Labour Organization (ILO) supervisory bodies and urging the Supreme Court to 
interpret the constitutional protection of freedom of association in line with the 
position of these institutions.10 The central interpretive issue is the relevance of 
international human rights for interpreting the freedom of association guaranteed 
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I will then turn to Europe, where 
human rights law can best be thought of as a polycentric galaxy, composed of a 
number of distinct sites and systems that exert gravitational force on one another.11 
Unions have invoked an array of human rights norms before differently configured ǡǯronouncements in order to 
characterise collective labour rights as fundamental. ǯ
attempts to constitutionalise labour rights at the European level have fared, I will 
discuss ǯǤThe success 
of unions in both Canada and the EU in invoking ILO instruments and jurisprudence 
in constitutional courts has precipitated a backlash by employers, who challenge 
both the legitimaǯ
supervisory machinery. To conclude, I will consider whether the use of international 
human rights by courts to interpret the scope of freedom of association exacerbates 
or ameliorates the displacement of democracy and constituent power as a basis of 
political legitimacy in global constitutionalism.  
 
Global Constitutionalism  
 
Double Movement and Multiple Constitutionalism  
 
                                                        
9 Ibid. 358. 
10 For a discussion of the composition and roles of the various ILO supervisory 
bodies see C LaǡǮǫǯ
ǯ ? ? ? ? ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
Journal 338. 
11 C KǡǮǫLaval, After 
Viking, After Demirǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
and Industrial Relations 293. 
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 Using Canada and the EU as illustrations, I have argued that since the 1980s 
we have witnessed a two-step or double movement of constitutionalism.12 My 
framework combined the political economy conceptualisation of Ǯnew 
constitutionalismǯ,13 which refers to the process by which markets have expanded 
throughout the globe, wiǯǮǯǡǮ-regulating market ǯǤ14  I characterized the attempt since the mid-1990s to constitutionalise 
labour rights as fundamental human rights at the international, transnational, and 
national levels as part of the broader movement to swing the pendulum back 
towards the social dimension of globalization and to re-embed the labour market.15 Ǯǯalisation appreciates that the 
constitutional process is multi-scalar (simultaneously national, transactional, and 
international), the existence of multiple constitutions (especially the economic and 
social), and the shift in power and legitimacy from legislative to adjudicative 
institutions. Thus, it chimes with legal scholarship that emphasizes the multiplicity 
of constitutions. 
 In Canada, Harry Arthurs and Eric Tucker have used the idea of multiple 
constitutions in their accounts of attempts to constitutionalise labour rights. Arthurs 
offered a taxonomy of constitutions, Ǯ
entrenches certain rights in the fundamental laws of the polityǯ.16 He identifies five 
constitutions: the rights-based, litigation-driven constitution; the valorizing 
constitution; the political constitution; the economic constitution; and the 
enterprise constitution. He describes how in Canada the different constitutions are 
in tension, and he emphasises the challenges of constitutionalising employment 
relations in global enterprises since it Ǯtical, economic ǯǮǲre-ȏȐǳthe deep structures of 
                                                        
12 	ǡǮǯbell, K Ewing and 
A Tompkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 244- ? ?Ǣ	ǡǮǣǡ	ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
Access to Justice 23; Fudge (n 2ȌǢ	Ǯǣ	ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
Review 25.  
13 
Ǯǯ-legal 
process whereby nation states cede their authority to interfere with the market. S 
ǡǮ
ǡǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 399. 
14 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time (Beacon Press 1944) 76. 
15 Fudge, Ǯǯ(n 12); 	ǡǮǣǡǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
Review (2nd series) 111, 119. 
16 ǡǮǣǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Ƭ ? ? ?ǡ405. 
 5 
ǯ.17 Tucker concentrates on ǡǯǯǡ and he 
contrasts them along three dimensions Ȃ thickness (the substance of rights 
protected), hardness (the enforceability of the rights), and geographic scale.18 Like 
Arthurs, he concludes ǯconstitution is more deeply embedded than 
laboǯǮ-ǯǤ 
 In Europe, Kaarlo Tuori ǯ
constitutions.19 Drawing on Luhmann, he emphasises the relational nature of 
constitutions through which the law relates to a constitutional object and 
establishes a constitutional relation.20 Tuori proposes a European-level taxonomy of 
constitutions based on their object: the economic constitution, which concerns the 
relation of law to the fundamentals of the economic system; the juridical constitution 
which comprises the fundamental features of the legal system; the political 
constitution, whereby the law constitutes and regulates the political system; and the 
security constitution, which ǯinternal and external security 
risks.21͒He explains that there are relations of implication, which can also be 
conflictual, between the different aspects of the constitution. These conflicts often 
take the form of clashes between different types of rights, and, according to Tuori, Ǯfunctional primacy of the economic constitution is manifest by the manner in 
which these clashes are framed as legal issuesǯǤ22 
 These accounts of constitutionalism capture its multiplicity and the 
dominance of the economic constitution, but the problem is that they do not 
sufficiently link the different movements or constitutions to changes in society. ǯfunctionalist approach to constitutionalism addresses this 
gap since it explicitly connects the processes of global constitutionalism to changes 
in social structure.  
Global Constitutionalism, Rights, and Courts 
 ǯ for his 
account of constitutional norms. Like Luhmann, instead of seeing constitutions as 
materialized principles, he conceptualizes them as reflexive adaptive meanings in 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 416 
18 ǡǮǯȋǯȌǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
Comparative labor Law and Policy Journal 355.  
19 ǡǮǯan (eds), The 
Many Constitutions of Europe (Ashgate 2010) 1.  
 
20 Ibid. 9. ǡǯ-theoretical approach to 
develop his idea of multiple constitutions, Tuori drops it on the ground that the 
notion of structural coupling, while apt for politics and law, cannot address the 
social constitution.  
21 Ibid. 8.  
22 K Tuori, The Economic Constitution Among European Constitutions, Helsinki 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 6, 2011, 39 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1844285> accessed 27 
February 2015. 
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light of changes in societal structure and evolving demands for political power and 
law in an increasingly complex, heterogeneous, and interlinked world.23 However, 
unlike Luhmann, Thornhill considers certain legal norms as indispensible for certain 
historical époques and regards legal and political systems as homologous rather 
than distinct.24 He also regards the function of the constitution as a distinctly 
political, in that it produces, restricts, and refines power utilized by states, 
supranational polities, and the transnational political system.25  
 Focusing on the norms of constituent power and rights, Thornhill contrasts 
classical national constitutionalism to global constitutionalism. The central 
normative principle of national constitutionalism is the doctrine of constituent 
power Ȃ that is, that legitimate political power is founded though the original 
exercise of a single popular will. Referring to revolutionary America and 
revolutionary Europe, he argues that the idea of constituent power, or the will of the 
people, provided a centralized sovereign state with plenary power.26 Rights are also 
a crucial element of classical constitutionalism and Thornhill explains that rights 
and constituent power are dialectically interwoven. At the same time as rights 
accentuate the inclusiveness of the modern political system (the expansion of rights 
bearers for example from propertied white men to propertyless men and then to 
women), they also establish the boundaries of the political system. Classical civil 
liberties preserve the different social systems Ȃ such as the economy, religion, and 
the media Ȃ from intrusion by political power. Rights enable courts to police the 
boundaries between the political system and its social environment. The modern ǯ
power of rights was internally adaptive as it enabled the political system to meet 
rising demands for legislation, build reliable normative structures, and stabilize 
autonomous subsystems.27  
 By contrast, in the contemporary global society, constituent power no longer 
legitimates political power and law. Law making and applying institutions extend 
across different geographic scales, some of which have a very attenuated connection 
with democratic processes. For supranational polities, the idea of constituent power 
as a basis for political legitimacy has always been weak.28 In the EU, the premier 
                                                        
23  Thornhill (n 8) 359. 
24 Ibid., 358-9 
25 Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in 
Historical-Sociological Perspective (Cambridge University Press  2011) 11; Thornhill 
(n 9). This position contrasts with that of Gunther Teubner, who emphasises societal 
constitutionalism, see Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and 
Globaȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ	ǯ
positions see J Priban, ǮConstitutionalism as Fear of the Political? A Comparative ǯ	ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ?
26 ǡǮǣPolitical Code of Transnational ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
 ? ? ?Ǥ 
27 Thornhill (n 8) 374-6 
28  ǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
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example of a supranational polity, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
has, by declaring the doctrine of direct effect and the supremacy of EU law, assumed 
the authority to produce a supranational constitution for European Member 
States.29 The basis of the CJEUǯȋȌ
national courts is its invocation of rights jurisprudence.30 In combination with the 
European Court of Human Rights and national courts, the CJEU relies upon human 
rights to check the constituent power of Member States and authorise and 
legitimate legislative acts that are precariously supported by democratic principles. 
The combination of the binding force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
ever-expanding scope of EU powers and competencies into areas that touch more ǡǯn by the Lisbon 
Treaty heralds a growing human rights role for the Court.31 
 At the national level, constitutional courts armed with the power of judicial 
review appeal to international human rights as a basis for legitimating their 
decisions. In Canada, the most significant constitutional amendment was the 
entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, which dramatically 
enhanced the prominence of the Supreme Court of Canada. The Charter has 
revolutionized Canadian political life, forcing legislatures into a dialogical 
relationship with judges in which rights are the leitmotif.32 The Supreme Court is a 
leader among national courts in referring to regional and international human rights 
and the rulings of other courts in developing a national constitutional order.33   
  The rise of international or transnational rights as a basis of legal and 
political structures is the most distinctive aspect in contemporary constitutionalism. 
Judicial institutions have increased legitimacy and power, and rights increasingly 
are inner-judicial constructs as constitutional bodies elaborate norms increasingly 
through reference to the decisions of transnational and international bodies rather 
than by involving constituent power. This shift is according to Thornhill, a self-
reflexive reformulation of the political system, which enables it to obtain and 
express new sources of authority to sustain its mobilization and its acts of 
legislation. The reliance on the interpretation of rights by international bodies 
enables the global political system Ǯǡ
over quickly widening cultural and geographic distances and in the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Law Journal 288.  
29 Thornhill (n 8) 366: D Schiek, Economic and Social Integration: The Challenge of 
EU Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 65-8,  
30 Schiek (n 29) 98.  
31 G De BúǡǮ	ǣ
Human Rights Adjudicator? (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 168.  
32 ǡǮǣ
Quebec Secession Reference ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 843. 
33 ǡǮǯ		ǡ	ǡ
(eds), Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: From Farm Workers to the Fraser Case 
(Irwin Law books 2012)  
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predictable or objective support or justification in national societies and their 
politically assembled constituenciesǯ.34 
 Global constitutionalism does not so much constitute a break with classical 
constitutionalism, but a reformulation; the key elements remain but they have been 
reordered and re-interpreted. Constituent democratic volition persists, but 
increasingly the invocation of rights allows the political system to dispense with the 
external dimensions of democracy without losing its legitimacy. Judicial actors and 
other adjudicative bodies apply internally authorized norms Ȃ influenced by 
international rights jurisprudence Ȃ as a ground for legal validity. In Canada, for 
example, the increased importance and power of the Supreme Court does not entail 
that the power of other political actors has diminished. What it means, however, is 
that the way political actors exercise and legitimate their power has changed. In 
delineating the boundaries of the constitutional protection of rights, the Supreme ǮǡǤǯ35 Elected governments and 
courts are engaged in a complex interaction that bǯ
responsibility for policy outcomes.36 Rights and constituent power serve the same 
function, both are constitutional formulas that enable political institutions to 
maintain their autonomy and enhance their power. Moreover, the rise of rights both Ǯdifferentiation and increasing internalism ǯ.37 
 From a systems-theoretical perspective, fundamental rights serve two 
critical functions in a complex and pluralist society.38 They ensure that the 
differentiation between different functional subsystems Ȃ the economy, religion, 
politics Ȃ is maintained, while they simultaneously enable individuals to participate 
in different subsystems as subjective rights holders with the equal right of inclusion 
and participation. The fact that fundamental or human rights are multivalent and 
there is no clear hierarchical legal order only adds to their potency.39 In effect, the 
rights/not rights code Ǯsystem to generate more power in order 
to cover its exchanges through society, and it allows it to transmit this power in a 
highly recursive fashionǯ.40  As constituent power is attenuated in the context of 
                                                        
34 Thornhill (n 8) 373. 
35 Radmilovic (n 32) 844.  
36 ǡǮ
s and Judicial Decision Making: The 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Age of the Charterǯ (2013) 46 Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 323; Radmilovic (n 32); M Hennigar, ǮȂ
Executive Interaction: Federal Government Concessions in ǯ
(2010) 43 Canadian Journal of Political Science 821. 
37  Thornhill (n 8) 375, italics in original, footnote omitted. 
38 Verschraegen (n 7) 101.  
39 S Bresson, Ǯǣǯ
Maduro, K Tuori and S Sanakri (eds), Transnational law: Rethinking European Law 
and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University Press, 2014); N Luhmann, Law as a Social 
System K A Ziegert (trans) (Oxford University Press 2004) 136.  
40 Thornhill (n 26) 585. 
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contemporary globalism, political power is legitimated through recourse to rights. 
While other social actors can invoke rights to check the power of the state, the state 
has a range of ways in which it can respond to successful rights challenges. 
 Despite the fact that the polyarchical constitution lacks a firm societal or 
volitional foundation, at each of its levels the courts, other judicial actors, and 
private agents recognize and apply rights as structural points of orientation and 
thereby providing a degree of internal cohesion.41 If fundamental rights are 
understood as the distinctive code of global constitutionalism, they constitute the 
element that enables the different constitutional subsystems to communicate, albeit 
in a manner that it contingent. But, the fact that rights are the pre-eminent form of 
legitimacy does not mean that conflict has been eliminated; instead it has been 
reconfigured and repositioned. The relationship between different judicial orders is 
fractious since rights and courts are plural and polycentric, and the structural role of 
rights fuels the growing culture of litigation.42 As Alain Supiot put it, Ǯjuridical 
devices specific to democracy, whether electoral freedoms or freedom of association, 
make it possible to process the stuff of political and social unrest and to convert 
tests of strength into test casesǯ.43  
 
III. Constitutonalising Labour Rights  
  
Canada: A Strategic Approach 
  
 In Canada, the labour movement did not participate in the constitutional 
drafting process and, thus, made no attempt to influence the wording of the ǯǤ44 However, unions were quick to 
initiate litigation invoking the freedom of association. In 1982, the same year that 
the Charter was entrenched, the federal and several provincial governments 
introduced a wide range of severe restrictions on collective bargaining and 
collective action as part of a monetarist agenda.45 Unions went to court and argued 
that freedom of association guaranteed by the brand new Charter should be 
interpreted in line with international human rights, especially International Labour 
                                                        
41 Ibid. 578. 
42 Transnational constitutionalism  is characterized by vertical or multilevel 
pluralism in that national courts rely on the interpretation of rights by transnational 
or international courts as well as a horizontal or multifocal pluralism since different 
judicial actors (at the same or different levels) contest jurisdictional authority with 
one another. Thornhill (n 26) 575-6.  
43 ǡǮǲǯǡ-Laval-
Rüffert: Economic freedoms versus fundamental social rights Ȃ where does the  
balance lie?  Debate organised by Notre Europe and the European  Trade Union 
Institute < http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/supiot-en.pdf?pdf=ok> accessed 27 
February 2015. 
44 ǡǮOrganized Labour and the Canadian 	ǯ 
(2007) 36 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 175.  
45 	ǡǮLabour is Not a Commodityǯȋ ? ?ȌǤ 
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Conventions, that protect the rights to bargain collectively and to strike.46  
 At the same time as they went to court, Canadian unions complained to the ǯross the country were violating the 
freedom of association. In fact, they outpaced all other national labour movements 
in lodging complaints with the International Labour Organization.47 Of the 76 ǯFreedom of 
Association (CFA) decided between 1982 and 2008, the Committee found Canada in 
violation of its obligations in 71, making it the subject of the highest number of valid 
complaints of the 183 member states of the ILO. Nevertheless, this dismal record 
does not necessarily mean that Canadian governments were particularly egregious 
in trampling on labour rights; it could also mean that Canadian unions were 
particularly adept at filing complaints. For the most part, Canadian governments 
responded to ǯǤ48   
 So, too, did the Supreme Court of Canada, despite attempts by trade unions to ǯ
the basis for interpreting the constitutional protection of freedom of association. 
Between 1987 and 2001, a majority of the Court simply ignored international labour 
rights and held that neither the right to strike nor the right to bargain collectively 
fell within freedom of association protected by the Charter. But, beginning in 2001, 
the Court changed tack and began to use international labour rights both to distance 
itself from pervious decisions and incrementally to expand the freedom of 
association to include elements of collective bargaining.  
 
Ignoring International Human Rights 
 
 The Supreme Cǯ 
section 2(d), which were released together in 1987 and came to be known as the 
Labour Trilogy, were marked by sharp disagreement over whether or not freedom 
                                                        
46 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is similar in many respects 
to the European Convention on Human Rights; it primarily protects civil and 
political rights, it applies vertically, and it has an explicit two-part structure of rights 
definition followed by justifiable limitation. It also provides a mechanism, which is ǡǮǯ
operation of key Charter rights regarding a statute or a statutory provision. 
47 M ǡǮ	ǣ 
What Remains 	ǫǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? The International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 397, 401; B Burkett, J Craig and  J Gallagher, 
Canada and the ILO: Fre ? ? ? ?ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
and Employment Law Journal 231,251-2 
48 Choko (n 47) 402; S L Kang, Human Rights and Labor Solidarity:  Trade Unions in 
the Global Economy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012) 173-6. 
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of association included the right to strike and to bargain collectively.49 The main 
reasons were delivered in the Alberta Reference, a case involving compulsory 
arbitration to resolve impasses in collective bargaining and a prohibition on strikes 
in the public sector.50   
 ǤǡǡǤǤ 
 ǡǤǮǯǡǮǯǤ51ǤǤǡǤ52ǡ ? ?ǡǤǮǤ ? ?ȂǯǤ53ǡ
                                                        
49 The Labour Trilogy refers to three concurrently released appeals: Reference re 
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v. Canada, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.).  
50 Of the six justices participating in the case, three held that collective bargaining 
was not protected by section 2(d), four held that strike activity was excluded, and 
two dissented. For a detailed discussion of these cases see J Fudge, Ǯ	ǯ in S Beaulac and E Mendes (eds), Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (5th ed.) (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2013) 5. 
51 Alberta Reference, n 49, 59.  
52  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right, G.A. Res. 2200 A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966))  and  International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
53 Alberta Reference (n 49) 355-58, 359. Canada has not ratified Convention 98 on 
collective bargaining. 
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ǤǤ
Ǥ58ǡǡǤǡǤ59ǡǯ	ǯǯ ? ?ǡǤ60ǯǤ 
                                                        
54 Ibid. 371.  
55 Wilson J. adopted a less deferential stance in both PSAC (n 49) and RWDSU (n 49). 
56 Alberta Reference (n 49) 375, citing Freedom of Association andCollective 
Bargaining: General Survey by the Committee of Experts in the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (Part 4B), ILO Geneva, 1983. 
57 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, para 63. 
58 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 
(S.C.C.) 
59 Ibid.  para.. 41. 
60 Ibid. para. 41, referring to Report in which the committee requests to be kept 
informed of development - Report No 308, November 1997 Case No 1900 (Canada) - 
Complaint date: 23-AUG-96 Ȃ Closed. 
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 In 2007, the Supreme Court overturned the precedent established twenty 
years earlier in the Labour Trilogy that collective bargaining was not protected by 
freedom of association. 61 The case, known as Health Services, involved a 
constitutional challenge to legislation that invalidated key provisions in collective 
agreements in the health services sector and precluded collective bargaining on 
significant issues. As the litigation wound its way through the courts, the BC ǯǯǤThe provincial government position was ǯǮǡǡǡǯ.62 It also questioned the legitimacy of the 
ILO as the appropriate institutional setting for examining the legislation, noting that  ? ?Ǯǯ
before domestic courts. After the court at the ǯ
constitutionality, the provincial government simply announced that it had no 	ǯ
met its obligations and refused to respond to requests from the ILO for follow up 
communications.63  
 The majority decision in Health Services, which was written by McLachlin C.J. 
and Le Bel J., characterised Dunmore as marking a new direction in freedom of 
association jurisprudence and expanded the activities protected under freedom of 
association to include aspects of collective bargaining, specifically the duty to 
bargain in good faith. It adopted the position staked out by Dickson C.J. in his dissent 
in the Alberta Reference to international human rights instruments that Canada has 
ratified; although not binding they provide an important normative resource for 
interpreting the ǯ freedom of association.64  ?ǯ
three main supervisory bodies, the CFA, the CEACR, and the Commission of Inquiry, 
had interpreted Convention 87 to include collective bargaining.65 But, in light of the 
wide range of international legal sources to which it referred, it is striking that the 
Court omitted any reference to the recommendations of the CFA regarding the 
legislation in dispute.  Equally remarkable is just how limited the right to collective 
bargaining that the Court considered to be protected by the Charter and the extent 
to which it departs from the understandings of the ILO supervisory bodies.66 It also 
specifically mentioned that the case did not involve the right to strike, which had 
been considered in the Labour Trilogy.67  
                                                        
61 Health Services and Support Ȃ Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v British 
Columbia [2007] 2 SCR 391.  para 35. 
62 Kang (n 48) 174. 
63 Case No. 2180, Report No 330 (Canada). Choko (n 47) 404-5; Kang (n 48) 173-4. 
64 Ibid. at paras. 73-75. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights , 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976, No. 46, and  International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976, No. 47.  
65 Health Services (n 61) para. 76. 
66 Choko (n 47) 412-7.  
67Health Services (n 61) para. 19. 
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 The combination of broad statements in support of collective bargaining and 
a narrow holding about what aspects of collective bargaining were actually 
protected invited confusion, and precipitated a rash of critical legal commentary as 
well as a great deal of litigation. Unions launched constitutional challenges to public 
sectors wage controls, restrictions on their ability to democratically select their 
representatives, and restrictions on their right to strike.68  
 An on-going dispute involving the legislative response to the Dunmore was 
the first case after Health Services in which the Supreme Court was faced with 
delineating the scope of constitutionally protected collective bargaining rights. The 
issue in Attorney General of Ontario v. Fraser was the constitutionality of 
Agricultural Employee Protection Act (AEPA), which was carefully crafted to meet 
the narrowest interpretation of the constitutional requirements set out in the 
Dunmore decision. 69 The question before the Supreme Court in Fraser was whether 
the AEPA, which did not require the employer to bargain in good faith with 
agricultural workers representatives, was constitutional in light of Health Services, 
which appeared to require, in addition to protection of the right to organize, a duty 
on the employer to bargain in good faith. Eight of the nine members of the Supreme 
Court held that the legislation did.70 However, the Court was badly divided over the 
scope of protection that freedom of association provides to the right to bargain 
collectively.71  
 The majorityǯ use of international labour law in Fraser was purely to defend 
its decision in Health Services in the face of a concerted attack by Justice Rothstein, 
who also questioned the validitǯ
law. While the majorityǯ 	ǯ
legislation in dispute did not conform to Convention 87, although they made no 
mention of it in Health Services, it ignored the 	ǯǯǤ72  
 Fraser sheds light on the sometimes-fraught relations between national ǯedom of 
association. The union that initiated the litigation in Fraser also brought a complaint 
to the CFA that the AEPA was in violation of freedom of association. In dealing with ǯDunmore 
violated Convention 87, the CFA decided to proceed with the complaint before the 
                                                        
68 Canadian Labour Rights Foundation, Summary of current Charter challenges and 
their impact on union security in Canada,  March 2015  
<http://labourrights.ca/sites/labourrights.ca/files/documents/summary_current_c
ases_march_2015.pdf> accessed 11 March 2015. 
69 2011 SCC 20.   
70 Ibid. para. 107. 
71 For a discussion see J Fudge, ǮConstitutional Rights, Collective Bargaining 
and the Supreme Court of Canada: Retreat and Reversal in the Fraser Caseǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
41 Indus. L.J. 23. 
72 Fraser (n 69) para 94. The interim Report was part of the record. Case No 2704 
(Canada): Interim Report in Reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association, 358th 
Report, ILOOR, 309th Sess., GB.309/8 (November 2010) 335, at para. 361 
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ǯ
constitutionality. By contrast, with respect to the complaint that accompanied the 
Fraser litigaǡ	ǯ
reaching its final conclusions and recommendations about whether the AEPA 
conformed to the principles of freedom of association until after it received the ǯǤ73 Noting that it was not bound by domestic judicial 
decisions, in its interim observations the CFA emphasised the absence of both 
successfully negotiated collective agreements under the AEPA and any machinery 
for the promotion of collective bargaining. 74   
 After receiving the Fraser decision, which ignored its interim observations, 
the CFA issued its conclusions regarding the conformity of the AEPA to the 
principles of freedom of association enshrined in the relevant conventions. 
Emphasing that its mandate was not to determine the constitutionality of the 
legislation under the Canadian CharterǡǮ
Supreme Court that agricultural employers have the duty to consider employee 
representations in good faithǯǡ but it went on to Ǯ
this duty, whether implicit or explicit, is insufficient to ensure the collective 
bargaining rights of agricultural workers under the principles of freedom of ǯǤ75 The CEACR also noted with regret that the government of Ontario 
was not considering amendments to the AEPA aimed at ensuring sufficient 
guarantees for the full exercise of freedom of association, including recourse to 
industrial actions without sanction.76  
 Fraser marked a hiatus in, and not a halt to, the incremental expansion of the 
scope of protection provided by the guarantee of freedom of association in the 
jurisprudence that began in Dunmore.77 It also signaled the unwillingness of the 
Supreme Court to interfere with government machinery for supporting collective 
bargaining, even if the mechanisms the government has selected has been found by 
ILO supervisory bodies to fall short of ensuring that workers enjoy the freedom to 
                                                        
73 Choko  (n 47) 413-4 
74 Case No. 2704 Report No. 358,Vol. XCIII, 2010, Series B, No. 3, para. 358.  
75 Ibid., para. 398.  
76 Observations of the CEACR adopted in 2012, published in 101sr ILC session 
(2012) Repeated concerns in 2012, which was published in 103 ILC session 2013 
77 In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 1, 
the Court held that collective bargaining included the right to independent and 
freely chosen representatives, and it took pains to make it clear that Fraser did not 
narrow the scope of constitutionally protected collective bargaining. Notably the 
Court did not refer to any international human rights in its reasons, which is likely 
due to the fact that the complainants were members of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and they did not lodge any complaints with the ILO supervisory committees 
since Convention 87, Article 9 provides that national laws govern with respect to the 
armed forces and the police. However, in a companion decision, Meredith v. Canada 
(Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2, the Court held that wage control legislation did not 
violate freedom of association since it did not constitute a substantial interference 
with collective bargaining. 
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associate. This reluctance on the part of the Court was confirmed in Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, where in a brief four paragraphs the Court 
agreed with the trial judge Ǯamendments to the process by which trade unions 
obtain (or lose) the status of bargaining representative ǥdoes not substantially 
interfere with the freedom to freely create or join associationǯǤ78  
 Despite its narrow approach to collective bargaining rights, the high-water ǯǯotection of freedom of association is Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour, where the Court ruled (by a five to two majority) that the right 
to strike is constitutionally protected.79 Writing for the majority, Justice Abella ǯ Alberta 
ReferenceǡǮǯǤ80 Overshadowing the issue of the constitutionality of legislation that made it 
more difficult for workers to bargain collectively was the question of the 
constitutionality of provincial legislation that unilaterally designated public sector 
workers as essential and prohibited them from striking. The legislation did not 
provide a process for an independent tribunal to review whether or not the work 
performed by the designated workers was in fact necessary to prevent danger to life, 
health, and safety. Nor did it provide a meaningful process for resolving collective 
bargaining disputes that went to impasse. Deploying the approach adopted in Health 
Services, which established that collective bargaining was protected under freedom 
of association in the Charter, the Court concluded that the right to strike was a 
constitutionally protected component of collective bargaining. Recognising that 
protecting health and safety was a legitimate and pressing objective, Justice Abella 
nonetheless held that the provincial government had failed to establish that the 
means Ǯǯ
constitutional right. 
 ǤǤǯAlberta Reference, Justice Abella ǯ
protecting the right to strike as part of a meaningful process of collective 
bargaining.81 She referred to the explicit protections of the right to strike in 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Charter of 
the Organization of American States; the nonbinding, but persuasive decisions of the 
ILO supervisory bodies that freedom of association includes the right to strike; and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which incorporates 
                                                        
78 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (n 57) paras. 199, 199-102. The CFA (Case no 
2645 (2010), see Reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association 371st Report 
of the Committee on Freedom of Association Governing Body 320th Session, Geneva,  
13Ȃ27 March 2014 GB.320/INS/12, 8-9 to which the CEARC referred Observation 
(CEACR) - adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013) considered the Trade 
Union Amendment Act to violate the principles of freedom of association.  
79 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (n 57).  
80 Ibid. para. 1. 
81 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (n 57) para. 62, citing Alberta Reference (n 49)  
359. 
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Convention No. 87 and the obligations it sets out.82 As additional support, she Ǯǯ
bargaining includes the right to strike.83 However, she made no reference to the 
observations of the CFA or CEACR that the legislation violated the principles of 
freedom of association, which she also ignored with respect to the denial of 
collective bargaining rights.  
 The Supreme Court of Canada has a clear practice of invoking the 
international labour rights that Canada has ratified to justify a change in the general 
direction of the jurisprudence, and it has begun to engage with the underlying 
values embodied in the international human rights instruments. But, while the Court 
refers to international labour and human rights instruments and their 
interpretation by ILO supervisory bodies in order to give meaning to the freedom of 
association, at the same time it ignores the observations of those bodies regarding 
the specific legislation whose constitutionality is before it. This interpretive 
technique allows the Court to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction, which is to 
determine the constitutionality of legislation or government action that is brought 
before it for scrutiny, instead of de facto delegating this role to ILO supervisory 
bodies by simply adopting their decisions. It also provides the Court with room to 
manoeuver since its decisions, unlike the ILO supervisory bodies, require 
governments to respond. Moreover, with the exception of Rothstein J., the Supreme 
Court has refused to question the competencies or approaches of the different 
human rights bodies that interpret and apply international labour and human rights 
instruments ǯ
CR 
and to the legal status of the right to strike. However, the recurring question is 
whether the federal and provincial governments will continue to refuse to 
implement the recommendations of ILO supervisory bodies in light of the more 
robust approach that the Supreme Court has taken to collective labour rights.   
 
 
ǯHuman Rights Galaxy  
 
 The first phase of constitutionalizing labour rights in what is now the legal 
space of the European Union was exhortatory rather than justiciable. In 1989, the 
European Council, with the UK dissenting, solemnly declared the Charter of 	Ǥǯ
rights nor provide new legal claims, and it was not legally binding on Community 
institutions or upon Member States. Although it included the right of association, the 
right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements, and the right to take ǡǮd down by national 
                                                        
82  Ibid. para. 65-70. 
83 Abella J. also referred to ECtHR decisions of Demir v. Turkey and Enerji Yapi-Yol 
Sen v. Turquie, German and Israeli court decisions, and constitutional protections of 
right to strike in France, Italy, Portugal and South Africa. Ibid. para 71 to 74.  
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legislation and practiceǯ.84 ǡǯ
collective labour rights within European law. In 2000, it was succeeded by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which also contains a suite of 
(differently worded) collective labour rights.85 Initially, the Charter was a 
proclamation by the European Parliament, Council, and Commission, and did not 
establish any new power or task for the Commission or Member States of the Union, 
or modify the powers or tasks defined by the Treaties. Moreover, several Member 
States  made constitutional reservations to it, and great care was taken to assure 
Member States that it did not grant greater labour rights than already conferred. 
However, the EU Charter was seen as elevating the status of collective labour rights 
in the European legal firmament and it can be used as an interpretive tool.86   
 The second phase of the project of constitutionalising labour rights was 
marked by the attempt to use international and European rights to give labour 
rights a hard edge. It was precipitated by legal actions brought by employers who 
sought to use free movement rights to restrict collective action by unions. In defense 
of their right to take collective action, unions invoked international and European 
human rights in order to persuade the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that labour 
rights were fundamental and took precedence over free movement. This phase 
spilled outside the EU proper. Instead of simply invoking international and 
European human rights norms before EU institutions, increasingly European unions 
began to take complaints to the institutions of the Council of Europe, specifically the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee on Social Rights, and 
the supervisory bodies of the ILO.  
 
 
Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Rights 
 
 Although some commentators recognized that with the enlargement of the 
EU to include member states with much lower wage and social standard there was a 
real possibility Ǯǯ, the actions brought by employers directly against 
trade unions alleging that their collective action was in violation of their free 
movement rights was greeted with surprise.87 In 2006, two national courts asked 
the ECJ to determine the extent to which trade union collective action may operate ǯǤ
context in which employers, and not unions, were posing the questions and market 
access was the primary objective, trade unions invoked international and European 
                                                        
84 B Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Hart Publishing 2005) 241-3. 
85  See Article 28b. 
86 P. SyrpisǡǮǢǤǤǤǫǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ27 
Industrial Law Journal 219; B Bercusson, European Labour Law, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge University Press 2009), ch 11; C. Barnard, EC Employment Law, 3rd edn 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 31-2; J Kenner, EU Employment Law: From Rome to 
Amsterdam and beyond (Hart Publishing 2008). 
87 Hepple (n 84) 213. 
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human rights in order to persuade the Court that the right to strike was so 
fundamental that it should take precedence over free movement. 
 Viking was a classic case of an establishment moving across borders in order 
to gain access to cheaper labour and a union federation and its affiliates engaging in 
transnational collective action to prevent it.88 Laval, by contrast, was a case of a 
service provider crossing borders and using home state workers who were paid at ǯ
collective action to insist that the service provider apply its collective agreement to 
the workers it had posted to the host state.89 In both cases the employers brought ǡǡǯ
actions breached free movement provisions in the Treaty, the freedom of 
establishment and services respectively.  The national courts referred the cases to 
the ECJ in order, effectively, to determine how to resolve the conflict between free 
movement and the right to take collective action.  
 The Grand Chamber of the ECJ released the two decisions within a week of 
each other in December 2007. Both extolled the fundamental nature of the right to 
take collective action. Referring to the European Social Charter, ILO Convention 87, 
the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in both cases the Court ǡǡǮ
fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of ǯǤ90 However, the Court went on to hold that the exercise of the right 
was subject to certain restrictions. Here the Court turned to Article 28 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which subjects the right to collective 
action to those restrictions imposed by national law and practices and Community 
law.91 The Court also decided that free movement provisions applied horizontally to ǯǡǡ
meant that the unions had to justify that the aim of their actions were legitimate and 
that the actions were proportional. In both cases, the Court adopted a strict 
approach to proportionality.92 Although the ECJ recognized that the right to take 
collective action in order to protect workers from social dumping constituted a 
legitimate objective that could constitute a restriction of the freedom of 
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completely nullified it. 
 In Viking and Laval the ECJ made reference to other human rights 
instruments an attempt to legitimate the status of its decisions regarding the 
fundamental nature of the right to strike.93 However, this striving for a kind of cross-
legitimacy did not lead to normative convergence.  In fact, it served to illustrate the 
indeterminacy of fundamental rights and to emphasize the different contexts and 
expertise of the different bodies.  
 ǯmittee of Expertsǯ treatment of a complaint involving the ǯViking and Laval illustrates increasing 
normative divergence regarding the interpretation of labour rights within a 
polycentric legal space.94 After British Airways announced that it was going to 
launch a subsidiary that would operate outside of the UK, a dispute arose between it 
and the union representing its pilots, the British Airlines Pilots Association (BALPA), 
about terms and conditions of work for its members in the new subsidiary.95 When 
the union threatened strike action in an attempt to resolve the impasse, BA claimed 
that it would be in violation of the freedom of movement as established by the ECJ in 
Viking and Laval.  BALPA brought the matter to the attention of the CEACR instead 
of continuing with litigation it initiated before the UK courts to determine whether 
those decisions were applicable to the situation. The difference between the 
CEACRǯ
economic freedom and that of the ECJ was stark. Although the ILO Committee began ǮȏǯȐViking and Lavalǯ, Ǯ
doctrine that is being articulated in these ECJ judgments is likely to have a 
significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike in practice in a ǯǤ96 It also made clear its disagreement with using 
the proportionality doctrine to assess the permissible restrictions on the right to 
strike at a national level. Similarly, in its observations on the final judgment by the 
Swedish Labour Court in which the Laval union was ordered to pay damages for 
what was at the time of its action lawful under Swedish law, the CEACR also 
distanced its analysis of labour rights from that of the European Court. These cases Ǯ
several treaties and conventions emanating from different entities, and in a specific 
case, these different entities view the meaning of the same human rights 
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differentlyǯ.97 As we will see, as European unions rely on an broadening array of 
legal institutions in which to vindicate labour rights as human rights this problem is 
recurring.  
 Despite the suggestion in the opinion of the Advocate General in Commission v 
Germany that the CJEU should take a more symmetrical approach to interpreting 
fundamental rights and freedom of movement such that that the latter do not 
always trump the former, the Court has continued to place economic freedoms 
above fundamental labour rights in the EU hierarchy.98 The apparent inability of the 
Luxembourg court to move away from an interpretive stance that emphasises 
economic freedoms has led commentators to advocate that the European Court of 
Human RiǮ solid juridical basis that would allow it to establish itself in 
a new role as guardian of fundamental social rightsǯ.99  
 
The European Court of Human Rights and an Integrated Approach  
 
 The turn to the Strasbourg Court as a way of integrating labour rights more ǯǯ
approach to interpreting freedom of association in relations to collective bargaining 
and collective action has changed over recent years. Its jurisprudence has followed a 
trajectory similar to that of the Supreme Court of Canada.100 From a position that 
rejected that the right to strike was protected by the freedom of association 
contained in Article 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR), it 
gradually extended the scope of protection to associational activities in the labour 
context to include both the rights to bargain collectively and to strike. Moreover, like 
its Canadian counterpart, the ECtHR began to invoke the interpretation of freedom ǯ
in approach to labour rights, although, in contrast to the Canadian Court, it has not 
insisted that the instrument be ratified.   
  ǯ ? ? ? ?Demir and Baykara v. Turkey stands in marked 
contrast to the approach to labour rights adopted by the ECJ in Viking and Laval.101 
At issue was the lack of express statutory provisions in Turkey recognizing a right 
for trade unions formed by civil servants to enter into legally enforceable collective 
agreements.102 The Grand Chamber referred to ILO Convention 98 and the European 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights as the basis for understanding the right to collective 
bargaining in the context of the freedom of association.103 The Court also made it 
clear that in searching for common ground among the norms of international law it 
has never distinguished between sources of law according to whether or not they 
have been signed or ratified by the respondent State.104 It adopted an approach that 
simultaneously confirmed the freedom of states to develop their own collective 
bargaining systems, and identified ILO standards and jurisprudence as providing 
minimum labour rights for the forty-seven members of the Council of Europe. 
 Shortly after it released Demir and Baykara, the ECtHR followed this broader 
approach that relied on international human rights in four cases involving collective 
action.105 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey involved an executive order that prohibited 
public servants upon pain of discipline from taking part in a one-day national strike 
as part of their campaign for a collective agreement.106 The ECtHR relied upon the 
European Committee of Social Rights jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of 
the right to strike in Article 6(4) of the European Social Charter. The Court noted 
that strike action constitutes an important aspect of the protection of trade union ǯǡǮ
corollary of the right of trade union association that it protected by ILO Convention  ? ?ǡǯǮsuring the 
effective exercise as the right to collective bargainingǯ.107 It held that strike action 
was protected under Article 11(1).108 Although it acknowledged that the right to 
strike was not absolute and that a restriction could be justified if it answered a 
pressing social need and was not disproportionate, in this case the Court found that 
the Turkish government failed to demonstrate the general and absolute ban on all 
public sector workers from striking was a necessary restriction. 
 The difference in approach taken by the two European courts to collective 
bargaining, collective action, and trade unions is stark. While both courts refer to 
many of the same human rights instruments, their treatment of international law is 
very different. The ECtHR, for example, engaged with ILO supervisory body 
jurisprudence and used it explore the positive obligations of states to protect 
collective bargaining, whereas the ECJ simply invoked ILO Conventions at the level 
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of general right and neglected nuance and detail.109 Moreover, the two courts take 
opposite approaches to proportionality in the context of limitations on the existence 
or exercise of labour rights. ǯ
constitutional courts to the treatment of human/labour rights have fueled the desire 
by several ǯǯ
jurisprudence.110 The Charter on Fundamental Rights also provides a way to link the 
jurispruǡǯ
greater force when it comes to human rights at the CJEU.111  
 In 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding as part of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Unlike the Canadian Charter of Rights or the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter is not directly enforceable by 
individual complaints resolved through adjudication. It does, however, impose 
obligations on Member States in a limited set of circumstances, such as when a EU 
obligation requires Member States to take action or when a Member State derogates 
from EU law.112 Further, Article 52(3) of the Charter explicitly regulates the 
relationship between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts, and there is a strong 
argument that the Charter cannot be interpreted in such a way that derogates from 
the level of protection guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Right as 
interpreted by the ECtHR.113  
 However, to date the limited evidence available indicates that the CJEU is 
unlikely to use the collective labour rights provisions in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights to constitutionalise labour rights. In the few cases in which the labour rights 
in the Charter were, or could have been, in play, the CJEU has been unwilling to take 
any step that would give these rights an independent legal bite.114 The Charter has 
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also been toothless when unions have attempted to use it to challenge reforms to 
Member State labour laws (such as reducing pensions, public sector salaries, or 
dismissal protection) that were required as a condition of loans to get them through 
their sovereign debt crisis.115  
 By contrast, unions have had a great deal of success using the Council of ǯity requirements that 
lower labour standards and to vindicate collective labour rights as fundamental 
human rights.116 Unlike its civil and political rights counterpart, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Social Charter provides a menu of rights from 
which states could choose to be bound and did not confer individual rights or an 
adjudicative system.117 The adoption of Collective Complaint Procedure in 1995 
enabled specifically listed organisations to bring a case against a state that has 
accepted the collective procedure. Composed of independent international experts, 
the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) has the exclusive competency to ǯǤǡ
ECSR jurisdiction is limited to a finding of non-compliance, and it has no 
enforcement powers. The only consequence of a finding of non-compliance is 
political; the Committee of Ministers has the discretion to issue a recommendation 
to a state.118  
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Europe (Hart 2014). 
116 Kilpatrick and De Witte (n 115) 6Ǣǯȋ ? ? ?Ȍ. For a discussion of the 
conflicting approaches taken by different human rights bodies to the austerity 
measures see Steering Committee for Human Rights, The Impact of Economic Crisis 
and Austerity Measures on Human Rights in Europe: A Preliminary Study on Existing 
Standards and Outstanding Issues, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 June 2014, 
CDDH(2014)017, 13, 21.  
117 Schlachter (n 113) 107-8.  There was a supervisory mechanism whereby a 
Committee reviewed the reports prepared by states in order to ensure 
implementation. 
118 Ibid. 108. 
 25 
 Ǯǯ
legitimacy and influence.119 In its conclusions on national reports, the ECSR has 
adopted a broad interpretation of the right to bargain collectively and to strike 
protected in Article 6.120 However, it has tended not to develop a conceptual 
analysis and normative approach to these labour rights, and, instead, has referred to 
ILO instruments and the findings of ILO expert groups.121 Recently, it has played a 
prominent role in characterizing labour rights as fundamental human rights. 
However, the ECSR ǯǮǯǢ
governments have, by and large, ignored its case law, few have ratified the collective 
complaints procedure, and the Committee of Ministers has been reluctant to 
recommend that states take action to respond to ECSR finding of non-conformity. 122 
 The discrepancy between the robust normative stance of the ECSR and its 
weak enforcement powers is captured ǯresponse to the ǯing that it had violated the labour rights guaranteed by the European 
Charter of Social Rights. Swedish unions brought a claim under the collective 
complaint procedure that the recent amendments to Swedish law in response to the 
Laval decision violated the right to strike protected in the ESC. Not only did the 
ECSR decision contain an extensive review of ILO standards, it went further than the ǯCEACR in its willingness to be explicit in subjecting a Member Stateǯ 
legislative response to a judgment of the CJEU to scrutiny for compliance with the 
ESC.123 Adopting an interpretation of the right to strike that was very similar to that 
of the ILO supervisory bodies, the ECSR found by a vote of 13 to 1 that the Swedish 
legislation violated Article 6(4) of the European Charter of Social Rights, which 
protected the right to strike, and the Committee of Ministers endorsed its 
decision.124 The Swedish government responded by complaining that the ECSRǯǮessary tension between the obligations of EU Member ǯǤ125 It noted 
that by questioning the legality of the lawful implementation of EU law under the 
Charter, the ECSR Ǯ indelicate positionǯǤ126  
                                                        
119 Kilpatrick (n 11)  ? ? ?Ǣǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
120 Busby and Zahn (n 110) 160. 
121 Ibid.  ? ? ?ǡǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ?0, 20 ?Ǣǯȋ ? ? ?Ȍ. For a ǯc¦ǡǮǯntouris and M Freedland 
(eds), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis (Oxford University Press 2013) 390. 
122 ǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
123 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Employees (TCU) v. Sweden Collective Complaint No 85/2012, 3 July 
2013, para. 120. 
124 Resolution CM/ResChS (2014)1, Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and 
Swedish Confederation of Professional  Employees (TCO) v. Sweden, Complaint No. 
85/2012, 5 Feb. 2014. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid. 
 26 
 Given the thick web of legal linkages between the different human rights 
systems in the EU, the discrepancy between the interpretation and application of 
fundamental collective labour rights is a wicked problem.127 One solution that has 
been advocated and that finds some support in the labour rights jurisprudence and 
the practices of international and transnational human rights bodies is to treat the ǯ
lodestar. Within the UN system, the ILO, which has a distinctive tripartite structure, 
is widely deferred to, and the WTO has accorded it the preeminent position to 
expound upon the meaning of human rights.128 The series of decisions emanating 
from the ECtHR beginning with Demir and Baykara in which the Court relied on the 
observations of ILO supervisory bodies to give meaning to freedom of association is 
the acme of this integrated and unified approach. 
 Despite the hope inspired by these decisions, it is now clear that the Court 
does not feel bound to adopt the same conclusions as these bodies. In RMT v United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR held that the ban on secondary action in the United Kingdom 
was a justified interference with the right to freedom of association in Article 11 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.129 The ECtHR referred to ILO 
Convention No 87, Article 6 of the European Social Charter, and its earlier decision 
in Demir ǯ ? ?
secondary action. It also accepted the CEACRǯǮǯ of Convention 87 on freedom 
of association.130 ǡǮ
made by the relevant monitoring bodies of the ILO and European Social Charter are 
not of much persuasive weight for determining whether the operation of a statutory 
ban on secondary strikes in circumstances such as those complained of in the 
present case remained within the range of permissible options open to national  ? ?ǯǤ131 Emphasising that the margin of appreciation was 
wide in the context of industrial and economic policies of the state, the Court 
concluded that in the circumstances of the instant case the operation of the ban did ǯ ? ?Ǥ132 
                                                        
127 Schalchter (n 113) 115, 116. Not only does the ECtHR refer to European Social ǡ	ǯ
solidarity, which contains the collective labǯǡ
Charter and interpretations of the Charter should not derogate from the it. See also 
Busby and Zahn (n 110) 161-3. 
128 ǡǮǣǡ
Future Basis upon ǫǯ
(2014) 30 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 357, 359; Bellace (n 97) 197. 
129 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v United Kingdom 
(application No 31045/10, 8 April 2014). 
130 Ibid. para. 97.  
131 Ibid. para. 98. 
132 The Grand Chamber refused to accept a referral from the Chamber decision. In 
subsequent cases, the ECHR has continued to interpret Article 11 to include 
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  While it is possible to speculate that a number of factors account for the ǯacquis of the ILO and Social Charter, ǯǡ
this decision makes it clear that the meaning of the values embodied in rights 
instruments changes depending upon the adjudicative context.133 ǯ
emphasis on the fact-bound nature of its decision-making, in contrast to the ECSRǯ
and CEACRǯǡ
to suggest the need both to carefully select future Article 11 complaints and to adopt 
an incremental strategy.134 Others have proposed the need to lodge complaints with ǯ	
answers about whether or not particular statutory restrictions violate the right to 
strike.135 But the experience in Canada, where these litigation strategies are well 
established, suggests that courts prefer to use the international human rights 
instruments and the observations of human rights supervisory bodies as a source of 
principles and general guidelines, rather than as the solution to a particular dispute. 
Even more significantly, the different approaches of the various human rights 
bodies suggest that there is a deeper problem. International human and labour 
rights do not function as Platonic Forms; instead, the meaning of the values 
embodied in the international and European rights instruments is contested, 
contingent, and provisional.136 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
protection of the right to strike, and in doing so it has referred to international 
human rights instruments, the observations of ILO supervisory bodies such as the 
Committee on Freedom of Association, the European Charter of Social rights , and 
the decisions of the ECSR. In these cases the Court was not as deferential to the 
national limitations on the exercise of the right as it was in the RMT case. In 
Tymoshenso v. Ukraine (application no 48408/12) 2 October 2014, the Fifth Section, 
in a unanimous decision, made extensive reference to this material, and in Hrvatyski 
««Ǥ (application no 36701/09) 27 November 2014, 
although the majority of the First Section did not refer to the ILO and ESC 
jurisprudence, it was extensively discussed in a concurring decision.   
133 	ǡǮǣǯȋǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȍ
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=5214> [7 March 2015]; A ǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ? ? ?. 
134 Kilpatrick (n 11) 317, n 81. 
135 Bogg and Ewing (n 133) 250.  
136 Ǯ
ILO instruments and committee decisions should not be regarded as some kind of ǤǯǡǮ	Ǣ
Getting BacǯȋȌǡVoices at Work: Continuity and 
Change in the Common Law World (Oxford University Press 2014) 141 at 159. I 
consider the status of any normative theory or understanding of human rights in 
contestable, provisional, and contextual. 
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The Challenge to the ǯ
Right to Strike  
 
 The most obvious illustration of the contested and provisional meaning of 
international labour rights is the on-going controversy at the ILO regarding the right 
to strike and the auǯǤ ? ? ? ?ǡ 
International Organization of Employers (IOE), one of the three constituents of the ȋǯ
Ȍǡ
proceedings of the annual International Labour ǡǯ
legislative forum, to challenge the right to strike.137 Although this challenge was not 
unprecedented Ȃ since 1989 the IOE has regularly voiced opposition to the right to 
strike Ȃ it was the most dramatic.138 The employer group refused to examine any 
case of serious non-compliance involving Convention 87 in the Tripartite Committee 
on the Application of Standard (CAS), which examines the reports of the Committee 
of Experts. The IEO claimed, correctly, that the right to strike is not expressly 
protected in Convention 87 on Freedom of Association,139 and, further and more ǡǯǡ
association as including by necessary implication the right to strike, does not have 
the legal mandate to interpret conventions.140 ǯ
ǯǡin its history the CAS did not examine an 
individual case.  
 Why did the IOE challenge the existence of the right to strike in Convention 
87 and why did it target the CEACR? Although the IOE has accepted the existence of 
the right to strike on a national level in many jurisdictions,141 it refuses to accept the 
authority of the CEACR to establish an international approach to collective action. 
Moreover, it appears that the IOE has targeted the CEACR because unlike the CFA, 
which is a tripartite body that deals with individual complaints that are brought 
before it, the Committee of Experts is an independent body of legal experts that 
comments on the implementation of conventions by Member States. The perception 
that the CEACR is more of a legal than political body enhances the legitimacy of its 
published observations, which are being relied upon by other adjudicative bodies 
and being given hard effects by courts. Moreover, Ǯby attacking the inclusion of a 
right to strike in Convention No 87, the IOE is seeking to avoid examination of its 
                                                        
137 LaHovary (n 10). 
138 Ibid. Typically the IOE registered an objection.  
139 Ǯǯ
fundamental Convention No 87 and Convention No 98 concerning the Application of 
the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, 1949. 
140 It is clear from tǯtitution that the International Court of Justice as the 
exclusive authority to interpret ILO conventions. However, as LaHovary (n 10) 325 
explains, since the CEACR has been charged with evaluating the implementation of 
conventions and this task inevitably involves a degree of interpretation.  
141This Statement is from the end of the session of the Committee on the Application 
of Standards. Record 19, Part I/35, para. 147), as quoted in Bellace (n 137) 30.  
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application by the Committee of Experts and the CASǯǤ142 By contrast, the tripartite 	ǯǡǡ	ǯǮǯǤ143 
 Following this challenge, the Committee of Experts stated that it does not Ǯǯǯ
constitution vests this competence in the International Court of Justice.144 However, 
the Committee did go on to state that in so far as the International Court of Justice 
does not contradict its views, they should be considered as valid and generally 
recognized. Unsurprisingly, this statement did not appease the Employers Group. 
Although it agreed in 2013 to discuss a list of cases in the Conference Committee on 
the Application of Standards, it insisted that there could be no comment on the right 
to strike.  
 Moreover, this challenge has been raised before other supervisory bodies, 
such as the ECHR and the ECSR. In the RMT case before the ECtHR, the UK 
government argued that because of the on-going disagreement about the status of a 
right to strike in the ILO and the non-ǯ
opinions, the European Court of Human Rights should reconsider relying on the ǯ
association. ǯ
originated with and were confinǯǤǯ-going disagreement about the status of a right ǡǯ
acknowledgement that its opinions are not binding, should require the ECtHR to ǯǮ
interpretation of certain ǯǤ145 However, it is important 
to recall that, despite this comment, in RMT the European Court did not follow the ǯ
action violated the right to strike.  Moreover, the IOE and Business Europe, which 
represents employers at the EU, brought the controversy about the legal status of 
the right to strike to the attention of the ECSR during its consideration of the ǯ
violated the right to strike in the European Social Charter.146  
 In 2013, the Canadian employerǯ
that ǯimposed Ǯǲone-size-fits-allǳ vision of freedom of 
                                                        
142 LaHovary (n 10) 354 
143 C LaHovary, µA challenging ménage à trois? Tripartism in the International ǯ. 
144 CEACR, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward ILC, 102 and 
Session (2013) 1-2; Novitz (n 128) 374. 
145 RMT (n 129) para. 97. However, the concurring opinion of Judge Wotjyczek ȋǤǡ ?Ȍ
ǯernational labour 
rights in Demir  ǯ
strike as provided in Convention 87.  
146 Novitz (n 128) 375. 
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association without regard to the unique and established features of the Canadian 
labour relations systemǯ.147 Emphasising the fact that the right to strike is not ǡǯ
representative also noted that Canadian courts had so far refused to find that the 
right to strike was constitutionally protected. For these reasons, Canadian 
employers informed the Ǯthat it would be entirely inappropriate to conclude 
that the carefully tailored restrictions on the strike activity, as adopted by 
democratically elected legislatures and consistently reaffirmed by independent 
courts, violated a ǲright to strikeǳǯ.148 
 ǯsubsequent decision that the right to strike is 
constitutionally protected is likely to have shaken ǯ
for national approaches to interpreting the right to strike over those of the CEACR. 
Not only did the majority decision refer to international labour rights instruments 
and the observations of ILO supervisory bodies in support of the view that freedom 
of association included the right to strike, it ǯ
claim that the right to strike is ǯacquis. This approach is in 
marked contrast to that adopted in the dissenting judgment, where Rothstein J. Ǯcurrent state of international law on the right to strike in unclearǯǤ149 
 ǯ
ǯto the ǯttack on the right to strike 
was to convene a three-day tripartite meeting on February 2015 to consider the 
interpretation of Convention 87 and the right to strike. In light of the opposition of 
the IOE ǡǯ
the interpretive question referred to the International Court of Justice. Instead, the 
social partners negotiated a solution to the three-year impasse over the right to 
strike, which begins with the Ǯ
workers and employers in support of their legitimate industrial interest is 
recognized by the constituents of the International Labour Oǯ.150 The 
agreement also acknowledges that the CEACR is an independent body composed of 
legal experts, which in undertaking its impartial and technical analysis of how the 
Conventions are applied in law and practice in Member State, issues non-binding 
determinations of the scope, content, and meaning of the provisions of Conventions. 
However, dǯ
role, in effect, the agreement simply defers answering the sticky jurisdictional 
                                                        
147 CAS Observation, 102 ILC Session (2013). 
148 Ibid.  
149 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (n 57) 150. He also claimed that the ILO 
supervisory bodies, none of which exercised a judicial function, disagreed over 
whether or not the right to strike was included in the freedom of association,  and 
asserted that the CAS, which was a superior body t	ǡǮ
reached a consensus on whether the freedom of association includes the right to ǯǤǤ ? ? ?Ǥ 
150 ILO, Tripartite Meeting on the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (no. 87), in relation to the right to strike and the 
modalities of strike action at the national level, Geneva 23-25 February 2013, 
TMFAAPROC/2015/2  
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questions to further negotiations. Nor does it prevent the IOE from challenging, 
albeit in a less public but still serious way, the ability of the tripartite CFA to 
function.  
 This challenge to the IL0 has prompted some labour rights advocates to 
question a strategy in which the Ǯnormative chainǯ for constitutionalising labour 
rights ends at the ILO and to urge a search for new sources of legitimacy.151 It also 
raises a deeper concern, which emphasizes the historically specific circumstances, 
namely the bargaining power of tradǡǯ
conventions and tripartite governance structure. Alan Bogg and Cynthia Estlund ǮȂ one that 
exercises power and enjoys various rights even as it is embattled Ȃ can easily be 
caricatured by opponents as a reflection of political power of that institution rather 
than one of basic human rightsǯ.152 ǡǮ
analysis of freedom of association that extends beyond traditional trade unions and 
is available to all people who workǯ.153 
 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada and the ECtHR suggest that 
in the short term the IOEǯs challenge to the legitimacy of the CEACR and to the legal 
status has been unsuccessful. But, more significantly, the longer-term impact of the 
challenge is to further attenuate democracy as an external form of legitimacy for 
contemporary constitutionalism. A distinctive feature of the ILO is that it is the only 
tripartǯȂ it is composed of representatives of government, 
employers, and trade unions. This tripartism provides the ILO with a distinctive 
form of legitimacy that courts lack. Although, unlike the CFA, the Committee of 
Experts is an expert body, which enhances its legal legitimacy, it is accountable to a 
body that inclǯǤThe same is not true of the 
International Court of Justice, nor, for that matter, the ECSR. The ILO is one of the 
very few governance instituǯ
their own governance. While it is true that ILO is an historically embedded and 
specific institutional and political comprise, so, too, are all governance mechanisms, 





  The shift to international human rights and the courts by trade unions to 
defend collective labour rights has occurred as at the same time as trade unions 
political voice in the national democratic sphere has been weakened, in part through 
the imposition of restrictions on electoral campaign financing.154 The inability of the 
EU to adopt a regulation (known as Monti II) on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action in the context of freedom of establishment and freedom of services 
                                                        
151 Novitz  (n 128) 378 
152 Bogg and Estlund (n 136 )159. 
153 Ibid.  
154 ǡǮǯǤ
(eds), Voices at Work (Oxford University Press 2014) 277.  
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following the controversy resulting from the Laval and Viking decisions illustrates 
the increasingly insurmountable hurdles to adopting a political and democratic 
solution to the question of the statuǯ.155 As unions have 
obtained support from international and transnational human rights bodies that 
collective bargaining and collective action are fundamental rights, employers have 
argued that these matters are better resolved at the national level by national courts 
or through legislative action. ǯ
argued that democracy should trump human rights in the context of attempting to Ǥǯalso challenged the legal 
status of the right to strike and the authority of the ǯindependent Committee of 
Experts. Although national and European courts have either ignored or dismissed 
this challenge, refusing to renounce recourse to international labour rights as an 
interpretive resource, they have been careful to avoid simply adopting the decisions 
of ILO supervisory bodies as a basis for their decisions. While Canadian and EU 
Member State governments have failed to act upon the findings of international and 
transnational human rights bodies that wield only exhortary power, they cannot 
ignore the judgments of constitutional courts.  
 The different remedial powers of the various human rights bodies helps to 
account for their different approaches to the ILO supervisory bodies treatments of 
labour rights. Those bodies, such as the ESCR, with soft power are more likely than 
constitutional courts, which wield hard power, to embrace the actual findings of 
either the CEAR or the CFA. The internal cohesion provided to the polyarchical 
constitution by international human rights can only be maintained at the level of 
general principle. When constitutional courts invoke international human rights to 
give meaning to the scope of labour rights in a specific dispute they invoke a variety 
of interpretive techniques, such as the margin of appreciation or proportionality, in 
order to preserve their institutional autonomy and to avoid simply ratifying the 
decisions and findings of international human rights bodies.  
 Unions in Canada and Europe, which are creatures of the social democratic 
entente after World War II, are currently engaged in defensive action; they are going 
to court to defend what they had previously achieved through political or economic 
power.156 Unlike other social movements that tend to claim rights of recognition of 
previously denigrated and marginalized identities, unions and the labour movement 
also focus on issues of redistribution that go to the heart of contemporary global 
capitalism.157 Ǯǯ
                                                        
155 ǡǮ	ǣǯ	ȋȌǡViking, Laval and Beyond (Hart 
Publishing 2015) 95. The social partners and Member States, for different reasons, 
opposed the regulation.  
156 ǡǮǫ	ǯȋȌVoices at Work (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 455, 472. 
157 J Fudge, ǮThe Canadian Charter of Rights: Redistribution, Recognition and the ǯǡȋȌ Sceptical 
Essays on Human Rights. (Oxford University Press, 2001) 335. The environmental 
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and social democracy.158 While sensible in the short term, in the longer term the 
posture of seeking to preserve what had previously been won is ill suited to meet 
the challenges thrown up by contemporary global capitalism.  Not only does the 
post-war scheme of labour rights fit uneasily with the contemporary work of work, 
asserting labour rights in courts is insufficient to re-embed the global market in 
bounded social spaces.159 Although different constitutions or subsystems are ǡǯ
environment. Bob Jessop explains how ecological dominance occurs when Ǯ
system in a self-organising ecology of self-organising systems imprints its ǯ
impose their respective logics on that systemǯ.160 Ǯ-oriented, 
market-mediated capitalist economy, with its distinctive self-valorizing logic, tends 
to have just those properties that favour ecological dominance over other types of 
social relationsǯ.161 Yet, even when conditions, such as global financialisation, favour 
the long-term dominance of the economy, crises may result in other subsystems 
gaining short-term dominance.162 The key challenge is to develop democratic 
institutions that can survive and flourish in a globalized space, and that have the 
capacity to take advantage of these opportunities. While courts can, and have, 
provided Ǯ-constitution actions of persons and groups 
                                                                                                                                                                     
movement may run into some of the same kinds of hurdles as the labour movement 
because both address issues at the heart of global capitalism.  
158 	ǡǮ	ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ
113.  
159 J FudǡǮBlurring Legal Boundaries: Regulating WorkǯFudge, S McCrystal, 
and K Sankaran, (eds) Regulating Work: Challenging Legal Boundaries (Onati series) 
(Hart 2012) 1. 
160 B 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ǯ ǯǯ 
6, http://bobjessop.org/2014/02/09/the-relevance-of-luhmanns-systems-theory-
and-of-laclau-and-mouffes-discourse-analysis-to-the-elaboration-of-marxs-state-
theory/ (Accessed: 27 December 2014). Ǯ
emergence relationship between two or more systems rather than a naturally ǯǡ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potential to become ecologically dominant. Ibid. 6, 7.  
161 B ǡǮ	-Liberalism? The Deepening Contradictions of US 
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ǯǡ163 they have just as readily provided even more robust protections 
for capital.164  
 Can international human rights invigorate democracy?  The political debate 
that the Laval decision provoked in Sweden about the appropriate legislative 
response suggests that judicial decisions can structure wider political debates.165  
Moreover, courts can provide a forum in which trade unions can exercise voice and 
thereby contribute to a continuous process of democratic deliberation.166 However, 
the democracy-enhancing potential of invoking international human rights in courts 
must be understood in the context of the broader functional role that courts and 
rights play in a globalized world, which is to substitute rights for constituent power 
as a basis for political legitimacy. It is also crucial to appreciate the extent to which 
constitutional courts have also given force to the economic constitution, which has 
tended to dominate the other constitutions. In Canada and in Europe, courts have 
become key institutions to which the future of labour rights has been entrusted. The ǯȂ is its mandate to protect fundamental 
human rights or to build a common market? Ȃ are critical in determining the extent 
to which labour rights will be given constitutional protection. Polycentrism and 
normative contestation characterize the contemporary human rights landscape, and 
different courts have different approaches to labour rights. How to resolve this 
normative uncertainty is not obvious.167 Rights have become free-floating signifiers 
in which courts through a self-reflexive process are the final arbiters of value. The 
shift to human rights and to courts as the basis of freedom of association exemplifies 
the hegemony of human rights law and the role of courts in global constitutionalism. 
It also reflects, rather than causes, the diminution in the legitimacy of constituent 
power and democratic action as a basis for political action. Unions are suffering the 
same fate as other democratic institutions in an era of global constitutionalism.  
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